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CIVIL DEATH-A NEW LOOK AT AN ANCIENT DOCTRINE
The incongruous and often unexplainable effects that arise from ap-
plication of the doctrine of civil death have plagued the law for cen-
turies. It has survived a long history to become a statutory incident of
a sentence to life imprisonment.
With living men regarded as dead, dead men returning to life,
and the same man considered alive for one purpose but dead for
another, the realm of legal fiction acquires a touch of the super-
natural under the paradoxical doctrine of civil death.'
Such has been the effect in fourteen jurisdictions which have retained
this statutory consequence of a life sentence. The application and conse-
quences of this doctrine vary among the states. Since several detailed
articles are available concerning civil death in the various states, 2 the
approach of this discussion is to give a broad overview of the doctrine
as it is generally construed. This article will present a brief history of
the fiction of civil death, some of the effects on rights of those sentenced
to life imprisonment, and finally an analysis of the doctrine in regard
to modern parole and rehabilitative penology. Having as its overall
purpose to show the problems that can and do result from the applica-
tion of an outmoded common law doctrine, and further, with the ob-
jective of promoting the repeal of these statutes as soon as possible, this
article will critically view the ancient doctrine of civil death. In a
time when the civil rights of all persons, including life convicts, are
more carefully protected than ever before, a doctrine which divests the
life convict of his estate while living and removes forever the capacity
to sue and contract deserves current, serious consideration.
EARLY ENGLISH COMMON LAW
A state of civil death, or civiliter mortuus as it was known at early
English common law, resulted under certain circumstances in which a
person though living, was considered dead. This status, very similar to
1. Note, Civil Death Statutes-Medieval Fiction in a Modern World, 50 HARV. L. REv.
968 (1937).
2. Comment, The Rights of Prisoners While Incarcerated, 15 BrUFFA.o L. REv. 397
(1965); Comment, Civil Death in California, 26 S. CAL. L. REv. 425 (1953); Note, The
Legal Status of Convicts During and after Incarceration, 37 VA. L. Rv. 105 (1951);
Annor., 139 A.L.R. 1308 (1942).
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natural death in that all civil rights were extinguished, resulted in three
situations: (1) abjuration, (2) profession, and (3) banishment. Ab- -
juration was a means of escaping criminal punishment by leaving the
realm forever. When one did so he was considered to be civilly dead.
Likewise civil death was a consequence of profession, whereby a man
entered a religious order to become a monk. Banishment occurred when
a man was attainted by act of Parliament and cast from the realm for-
ever.3 The civil death that resulted from these sources is unknown in
the United States.4 A further source of common law civil death of
which civil death was an integral element was attainder which resulted
from conviction of a felony or treason. Attainder also had as a conse-
quence corruption of blood and forfeiture of estate.5 These ancient
remnants of attainder, corruption of blood and forfeiture of estate,
found in the English common law have generally disappeared. 6 They
were never recognized in the United States or were forbidden by state
constitutions and statutes. 7
Since civil death more commonly resulted from attainder (conviction
for felonies) than from the other sources, all the principal incidents of
attainder should be considered. First, corruption of blood meant that the
one attainted could no longer devise his holdings to his heirs nor re-
ceive property by devise or descent from his ancestors (under this
principle land escheated to the sovereign). Second, forfeiture provided
that all land of the convicted felon was forfeited to the sovereign upon
sentence. Civil death, the third and most important incident of at-
tainder, resulted in the loss of the convict's civil rights and he was
thereby disqualified from being a witness, prohibited from bringing an
action or performing any legal function, and he was in effect regarded
as dead by the law.8
Since conviction of a felony at early common law resulted in the
death penalty, 9 the effect of civil death was normally unnecessary. Al-
3. See W. BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES '132.
4. Several American Jurisdictions passed bills of attainder in the latter part of the
eighteenth century. Jackson v. Catlin, 2 Johns. 248 (N.Y. 1807).
5. 2 W. BLAcKsToNE, ComMEimniams *251-57; 4 W. BLACKSToNE, ComEN-rARwEs
381-82; 1 J. CHirry, CQxluNAL LAw *725 (1847).
6. Howard v. State, 28 Ariz. 433, 237 P. 203 (1925); State v. Duket, 90 Wis. 272, 63
N.W. 83 (1895).
7. E.g., ILL. CoNsr. art. 1I, S 11; KAN. STAT. AqN. § 21-120 (1964).
8. Avery v. Everett, 110 N.Y. 317, 324, 18 N.E. 148, 150 (1888).
9. Shapiro v. Equitable Life Assur. Soc'y, 182 Asc. 678, 45 N.Y.S.2d 717 (1943);
Jones v. Jones, 249 App. Div. 470, 471, 292 N.Y.S. 705, 706, aff'd 274 N.Y. 574, 10 N.E.2d
558 (1937).
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though the convicted felon was considered dead by the law, it mattered
little which rights were lost and which were retained, for his natural
state was soon to coincide with that of his legal state by means of exe-
cution. Thus, civil death was a practical way of settling the earthly
affairs of a convicted felon soon to be executed.
CIVIL DEATH IN THE UNITED STATES
Civil death and the other incidents of attainder were never a part
of the common law recognized in the United States, and in the absence
of statute, courts have refused to recognize them as an incident of con-
viction. 10 Nevertheless, civil death has been revived by statute and is
currently in effect, in various forms, in fourteen states. 1 When civil
death statutes were enacted, the legislatures of many states failed to
provide a proper definition. Such enactments presupposed that civil
death would have the same effect as it had at English common law.
Conditions had changed, however, and the death penalty, once imposed
on most felons, was rarely used and was generally replaced by the life
sentence. Imposed as an incident of life conviction, civil death derived
substantive effects where it originally was intended to merely settle the
estate of an executed or banished felon. As a result, courts, in their
interpretation of these statutes, have been confused on the question of
whether or not to render a strict construction as at common law or to
10. Thomas v. Mills, 117 Ohio St. 114, 157 N.E. 488 (1927); Davis v. Laning, 85 Tex.
39, 19 S.W. 846 (1892). Contra, In re Lindewall's Will, 287 N.Y. 347, 39 N.E.2d 907, 910
(1942), which says that the common law consequences of conviction including civil
death continue until abrogated by constitution or statute.
11. Am. REv. STAT. ANN. § 13-1653 (1956); CAL. PENAL CODE § 2600 (West 1956)
as amended, (Supp. 1968); IDAHO CODE: ANN. § 18-311 (1948); KAN. STAT. ANN. § 21-118
(1964); Mo. STAT. ANN. § 222.010 (1959); MONT. REv. CODES ANN. § 94-4721 (1947);
N.Y. Crv. RIGHrrs LAw § 79 (McKinney Supp. 1969); N.D. CODE ANN. § 12-06-27
(1960); OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 21, § 66 (1951); R.I. GEN. LAWS ANN. § 13-6-1 (1956);
UTAH CODE ANN. tit. 76, § 1-37 (1953).
Although the following states do not have civil death statutes per se, they do have
statutes with similar results. ALAsKA STAT. § 11.05.080 (1962); HAWAII REv. LAWS
§ 353-38 (1968); ME. REv. STAT. ANN. tit. 19, § 631 (1964) as amended (Supp. 1970).
Three states have recently repealed their civil death statutes, AiA. CODE ANN. tit. 61,
§ 3 (1960) repealed by § 1, [1965] Act, 1st Ex. Sess. 381; MiNN. STAT. ANN. § 610.34
repealed by ch. 753, art II, § 17 [1963] Laws; VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 13, § 7005 (1959)
repealed by No. 83, [1963]. Typical of the civil death statutes is Oklahoma's: "A person
sentenced to imprisonment in the state prison for life, is thereby deemed civilly
dead." Such a statute does nothing to define what is actually meant by civil death.
The Utah civil death act is interesting, yet rather incongruous in that the initial section
employs the typical language setting forth civil death for the life convict while the
"exceptions" section of the statute restores most, if not all, of his civil rights.
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modify it to meet changing conditions.' 2 These civil death statutes were
never held to be declaratory of the common law, and civil death conse-
quent to abjuration, banishment, and profession never became a part of
American jurisprudence. 13 The statutory form that did evolve created
considerable confusion since the exact incapacities intended to accom-
pany civil death were not enumerated. It is apparent that civil death
emerged in a state of conflict, a condition from which it has never been
able to extricate itself. Court interpretations have varied widely. An
early Maine decision construed its civil death statute to mean that
one who is sentenced to life in prison is civilly dead and he loses
all his civil rights-considered in law, dead. His capacities among
his fellow members of society are extinct and he can no longer
perform any legal function.14
The court in Ruffin v. Commonwealth likewise adopted a strict view
when it said:
He [the convicted felon] has as a consequence of his crime, not
only forfeited his liberty but all his personal rights except those
which the law in its humanity affords him. He is for the time
being a slave of the state.15
A Kentucky court in Dept. of Welfare v. Brook relaxed the common
law view of civil death and allowed felons to sue and to inherit and
convey property.16
In all cases civil death statutes have been considered penal and have
been strictly construed.17 Strict construction narrows the application of
civil death statutes to only two groups of persons, those sentenced to
life imprisonment and those facing the death sentence.' Further limita-
tions restrict the doctrine to those convictions which result in incarcera-
12. Byers v. Sun Savings Bank, 41 Okla. 728, 731-32, 139 P. 948, 949 (1914); Avery
v. Everett, 110 N.Y. 317, 18 N.E. 148 (1888).
13. Various state statutes expressly provide civil death consequences for a life con-
viction. See note 11, supra.
14. Sullivan v. Prudential Ins. Co., 131 Me. 228, 160 A. 777, 778 (1932).
15. 62 Va. (21 Gratt.) 790, 796 (1871).
16. 306 Ky. 243, 206 S.W.2d 915 (1947). This relaxed view of civil death was more
recently expressed in Grasso v. McDonough Power Equip., Inc., 264 Cal. App. 2d 597,
70 Cal. Rptr. 458 (1968).
17. Hayashi v. Lorenz, 42 Cal. App. 2d 848, 271 P.2d 18 (1954).
18. Jones v. Jones, 249 App. Div. 470, 292 N.Y.S. 705, aff'd 274 N.Y. 574, 10 N.E.2d
558 (1937).
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don in state prisons.' 9 Other interpretations construe civil death as
occurring at the time of incarceration;20 furthermore, it has been held
that the doctrine has no extraterritorial effect.21
Right to Sue and be Sued
A life convict's right to appear before a court for any reason was
generally foreclosed at common law. The same result holds true in states
which regard a life convict as losing his civil rights.22 Utah is the sole
exception allowing a life convict free access to the courts.2 This access
can be subdivided by viewing the convict as a plaintiff and as a defendant
in both civil and criminal actions." At common law, access to the
courts to institute civil proceedings was generally denied as a proper
restriction of a convict's rights.25 With few exceptions, however,
courts have found that a civilly dead convict may nevertheless be
subject to civil suit as a defendant,26 especially when sued for claims
19. Hill v. Gentry, 280 F.2d 88 (8th Cir. 1960), cert. denied, 364 U.S. 875 (1960);
Hayashi v. Lorenz, 42 Cal. App.2d 848, 271 P.2d 18 (1954).
20. Harmon v. Bower, 78 Kan. 135, 96 P. 51 (1908).
21. Panko v. Endicott Johnson Corp., 24 F. Supp. 678 (N.D.N.Y. 1938). This case
expresses the rule that a sentence or conviction in one state can have no effect by way
of penalty or disability beyond the limits of the state in which the judgment is
rendered, in absence of an express statute in another state giving effect to such sen-
tence. Logan v. United States, 144 U.S. 262 (1892); People v. Gutterson, 244 N.Y. 243,
155 NE. 113 (1926); Burdine v. Kennon, 186 Tenn. 200, 209 S.W.2d 9 (1948). Contra
Urbano v. News Syndicate Co., 232 F. Supp. 237 (S.D.N.Y. 1964); Natasi v. State,
186 Misc. 1051, 61 N.Y.S.2d 438 (1946); Pallas v. Misericordia Hospital, App. Div. 1,
34 N.Y.S.2d 881, aft'd, 291 N.Y. 692, 52 N.E.2d 590 (1943).
22. De Cloux v. Johnston, 70 F. Supp. 718 (N.D. Cal. 1947); Quick v. Western Ry.,
207 Ala. 376, 92 So. 608 (1922); Sullivan v. Prudential Ins. Co., 131 Me. 228, 160 A. 777
(1932); In re Cirello's Estate, 50 Misc.2d 1007, 271 N.Y.S.2d 841 (Sur. Ct. 1966); Grant
v. State, 192 Misc. 45, 77 N.Y.S.2d 756 (Ct. Cl. 1948); Natasi v. State, 186 Misc. 1051,
61 N.Y.S.2d 438 (Ct. Cl. 1946).
23. UTAH CODE Am. § 76-1-38 (1953). "The provisions of the two next preceding
sections [civil death statute] must not be construed to render the persons herein
mentioned [life convicts] . . . incapable . . . of maintaining a civil action...." Id.
24. Comment, Civil Death in California, 26 S. CAL. L. REv. 425, 429 (1953).
25. Ex parte Maro, 133 Cal. App. 411, 248 P.2d 135 (1952); Harel v. State, 17 Misc.
2d 950, 188 N.Y.S.2d 683 (Ct. Cl. 1959) (New York is the exception which, by enabling
acts, allows convicts to sue for tort injuries sustained while in prison). Tomaselli v.
State, 168 Misc. 674, 6 N.Y.S.2d 435 (Ct. Cl. 1938); N.Y. Civ. RIGHs LAW § 79 n. 10
(McKinney Supp. 1969). For a discussion of a convict's access to the courts see
Vogelman, Prison Restrictions-Prisoner Rights, 59 J. CrIM. L.C. & P.S. 386, 393 (1968);
Annot., 139 A.L.R. 1309, 1314 (1942).
26. Jones v. Allen, 8 Cal. Rptr. 316, 185 Cal. App. 2d 278 (1960); Application of
McNally, 144 Cal. App. 2d 531, 301 P.2d 385 (1956) (the court held that though the
[Vol. 11:988
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by his creditors,27 and accordingly in such cases is given the right to
defend.2 Though his right to sue and defend as an individual is often
prohibited,29 the power to assert such rights through an administrator or
guardian is more fully accorded in several states.30 While access to the
courts in regard to civil matters is generally restricted, a convict, how-
ever, has unrestrained access to the courts to assert, by means of habeas
corpus, that his confinement is unlawful.3' Protection of this right is
fundamental and "access to the courts [to seek release] is one of the
rights a prisoner clearly retains." 32 Denial or undue restrictions on the
reasonable access to the courts is a denial of due process.33
It is difficult to see how society may be served by preventing convicts
from legally protecting their property and prosecuting their claims.
One limited, yet possible, explanation of the policy is that "retention of
disability is apparently based on the necessity of maintaining prison
discipline and morale in the face of endless law suits which might be
brought by prisoners with nothing else to do." 34 Whether the purpose
intended here outweighs the importance of the convict's freedom to as-
sert his legal rights is questionable; one view which incorporates both
is provided for by statute in California.35 Under this statute the Adult
convict could be sued, he had- no right to be present at the proceedings); Fidelity &
Deposit Co. v. Boundy, 236 Mo.App. 656, 158 S.W.2d 243 (1942).
27. Coffee v. Haynes, 125 Cal. 561, 57 P. 482 (1899) where a debtor was convicted
of a felony and sentenced to life imprisonment. It would be unfair for a criminal
to escape payment of his debts by committing crime. See New v. Smith, 73 Kan. 174,
178, 94 P. 1030, 1031 (1906).
28. Application of McNally, 144 Cal.App. 2d 531, 301 P.2d 385 (1956); People v.
Lawrence, 140 Cal.App.2d 133, 295 P.2d 4 (1956); In re Brown's Trust, 19 App.Div.2d
24, 240 N.Y.S.2d 387 (1963); North Dakota provides such a right by statute, N.D. CODE
ANN. § 12-06-27 (1960).
29. Quinn v. Johnson, 273 App. Div. 961, 78 N.Y.S.2d 499 (1947).
30. Hawaii, Missouri and New York allow a trustee or guardian to sue and be sued
instead of the convict. Application of Fein, 51 Misc. 2d 1022, 274 N.Y.S. 2d 547 (1966);
State ex rel. Bricker v. Nolte, 350 Mo. App. 842, 169 S.W.2d 50 (1943); HAWAi REv.
LAws § 353-35 (1968).
31. Miller v. Turner, 64 N.D. 463, 253 N.W. 437 (1934).
32. Coleman v. Peyton, 362 F.2d 905, 907 (4th Cir. 1966); accord, Ex parte Hull,
312 U.S. 546 (1941); Kirby v. Thomas 336 F.2d 462 (6th Cir. 1964); Warfield v. Ray-
mond, 195 Md. 711, 71 A.2d 870 (1950).
33. Hatfield v. Bailieaux, 290 F.2d 632, 636 (9th Cir.), cert. denied 368 U.S. 862
(1961).
34. Cf. Weller v. Dickson, 314 F.2d 598, 601-04 (9th Cir.) (Dunway, J., concurring),
cert. denied, 375 U.S. 845 (1963). See Comment, The Rights of Prisoners While In-
carcerated, 15 BUFFALO L. Rrv. 397 (1965).
35. CAL. PENAL CODE § 2600 (West Supp. 1968):
A sentence of imprisonment in the state prison for any term suspends all
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Authority has the power to grant and withhold the legal capacities of
the convicts on a case by case basis so as to do substantial justice while
maintaining discipline and facilitating penal administration. 6 Whether
a convict needs access to the courts depends on which rights are granted
to him or which rights he retains. It will be more apparent later in this
discussion that certain property rights retained by convicts require access
to the courts for their protection; to restrict access to the judiciary
renders incomplete the convict's right to property.
Right to Contract
An early New York decision stated that a life convict could make no
contract which he could enforce.17 This result would no longer be
reached in New York which, with six other states, has provided by
statute for the convict's capacity to contract, at least to a limited extent.38
These statutes typically provide that a convict's civil death will not
prevent him from making or acknowledging a sale or conveyance of
property.39 They have been narrowly interpreted, however, limiting
these property contracts to real estate transactions, 4 under the theory
that the legislatures intended to deny convicts all rights not specifically
granted.41
Based on the inherent right of a convict to have access to the courts
in order to seek parole or habeas corpus, it can be inferred that even a
civilly dead convict has the right to contract for legal services in his
behalf. This was established by the Oklahoma court in Byers v. Sun
Savings Bank.42 In this case a prisoner executed a note and mortgage to
an attorney for legal services performed in order to obtain his parole.
In an action by the attorney to enforce the obligation, the convict as-
the civil rights of the person so sentenced .... But the Adult Authority
may restore to said person during his imprisonment such civil rights as
the authority may deem proper....
36. Grazzo v. McDonough Power Equip. Inc., 264 Cal. App.2d 723, 70 Cal. Rptr. 458
(1968).
37. Avery v. Everett, 110 N.Y. 317, 18 N.E. 148 (1889).
38. See note 11, supra.
39. Amiz. REv. STAT. AitN. § 13-1653 c (1956). "Persons sentenced to imprisonment in
the state prison for any term shall not thereby be rendered . . . incapable of making
or acknowledging a sale or conveyance of property."
40. Rosman v. Cuevas, 176 Cal. App.2d 867, 1 Ca.Rptr. 485 (1959) which held that
a woman in prison on a felony conviction was incapable of contracting for the sale
of an automobile.
41. See Miller v. Turner, 64 N.D. 463, 467, 253 N.W. 437, 439 (1934); cf. In re
Donnelly's Estate, 125 Cal. 417, 419, 58 P. 61 (1899).
42. 41 Okla. 728, 139 P. 948 (1914).
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serted that civil death brought about his incapacity to contract. The
court rejected this and held that he not only retained the right to con-
tract, but that he also retained its corresponding duties. Only two states,
one by statute 3 and the other by judicial decision,44 forbid a convict
the right to contract even in these limited instances. Considering the
inconsistencies surrounding the capacity to sue and contract, civil death
through interpretation has endowed the life convict with an anomalous
situation in which he has the right to make contracts which he can not
enforce, to enforce contracts which he had no right to make, and gen-
erally creating a Pandora's box in this area of the law.
Property Rights
From a survey of the various statutes, it is apparent that a life convict
is readily given more freedom to convey or sell his property than he
is given to exercise most of his other rights. This particular right is re-
tained by the convict or his personal representative in eight states.45 The
rights, applicable to the sale of personalty, are demonstrated in Davis v.
Superior Court in and for County of Matin.4" There the defendant was
charged with conspiracy to remove from prison a manuscript of a book,
The Face of Justice, written by Caryl Chessman while serving a life
sentence. The court, in dismissing the charge and the state's claim to
the manuscript said, "an odor of totalitarianism infects the concept that
any product of the prisoner's mind automatically becomes the property
of the state." 47 It was held that the manuscript was the property of
Chessman and could be made the object of a sales contract executed by
him even though he was suffering under a civil death disability. In
most states, the same would hold true to a conveyance of real property.4
Closely related to the right to convey is the right to receive and
transmit property by inheritance and devise. There is a diversity of
opinion throughout the civil death states as to the status of this right.
43. R.I. GEN. LAws ANN. tit. 13, § 6-1 (1956).
Every person imprisoned in the adult correctional institutions for life
shall thereupon, with respect to all rights of property, to the bond of
matrimony and to all civil rights and relations of any nature whatsoever,
be deemed to be dead in all respects, as if his or her natural death had
taken place at the time of such conviction ...
44. Williams v. Shackleford, 97 Mo. App. 322, 11 S.W. 222 (1889).
45. See note 11, supra.
46. 175 Cal. App. 2d 8, 345 P.2d 513 (1959).
47. Id. at 520
48. In re Olson's Estate, 202 Misc. 2d 1113, 118 N.YS.2d 81 (1959).
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Four states provide for this right either by statute49 or by judicial deci-
sion,1° while it is expressly forbidden in two states.5' The remaining
eight jurisdictions make no express mention of the right to receive and
transmit property by inheritance and devise. Involved in the issue of
the right of inheritance is whether the loss of such right would constitute
a forfeiture by divesting the convict's estate in favor of his heirs before
his natural death. 2 The statutes and constitutions of many states pro-
hibit the forfeiture of a convict's property upon conviction "except in
cases where a forfeiture is expressly imposed by law." r, Even when
civil death statutes provide for the estate of the convict "to be ad-
ministered as though he were actually dead," courts have held that the
property does not pass to the heirs until the convict's natural death and
thus, is not a forfeiture. 4
The two states which forbid the convict the right to devise his proper-
ty provide for the estate of a life convict to pass to his heirs upon his
sentencing. 5 Interpreted literally, this presents an unreasonable situa-
tion where the convict is subsequently pardoned or paroled in a penni-
less condition. 6
Mariage Rights
There are two prevailing views as to the effect of civil death on the
marriage relationship. The New York Court of Appeals presented one
49. California, CAL. PENAL CODE § 2600 (West 1956), provides for a convict's right
to inherit, see In re Dickinson's Estate, 125 P.2d 542, 51 Cal. App.2d 638 (1942); UTAH
CODE ANN. tit. 76, § 1-38 (1953) (expressly allowing convicts to devise and by implica-
tion to inherit).
50. New York: Application of Fein, 51 Misc. 2d 1012, 274 N.Y.S.2d 547 (1966);
Oklahoma: Hine v. Simon, 95 Okla. 86, 21g P. 1072 (1923).
51. Rhode Island: R.L GEN. LAws ANN. § 13-6-1 (1956) (a life convict has no power
to make a will); id. at § 13-6-7 (upon imprisonment for life the estate of a life prisoner
passes automatically to his heirs).
Hawaii: HAWAII REv. STAT. § 353-38 (1968). "All property given or in any manner
whatsoever accruing to a convict . . . sentenced for life, shall vest in his heirs." This
statute can be construed to mean that the convict may neither receive by inheritance
nor devise by will since in either case the property is out of the hands of the convict
and vested automatically in his heirs. Cf. Hunter v. Hunter, 361 Mo. App. 799, 237
S.W.2d 100 (1951).
52. See, Wall v. Pfanschmidt, 265 Ill. 180, 106 N.E. 785 (1914); State v. Duket, 90
Wis. 272, 63 N.W. 83 (1895); Kenyon v. Saunders, 18 R.I. 590, 30 A. 470 (1894).
53. In re Donnelly, 125 Cal. 417, 58 P. 61 (1899).
54. Smith v. Becker, 62 Kan. 541, 64 P. 70 (1901).
55. See note 51, supra.
56. A very good discussion of the civil death effect upon the estate of a life convict
is found in Annot., 139 A.L.R. 1308, 1316-1322.
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view in the case of In re Lindewall.57 The court in that case held that
the marriage and its consequent rights were ipso facto dissolved upon
the civil death of the imprisoned spouse without any election or judicial
decree of divorce being required. The court considered at length as to
what would be a proper election if such were required and, unable to
settle on a standard, found an ipso facto termination stating:
We think there are many reasons why it is more logical to hold
that it is a sentence of life imprisonment, with consequent civil
death, which ipso facto acts upon and affects the marital relation
at least to the extent of liberating the husband or wife of the one
sentenced .... 58
This view is far from satisfactory since it fails to consider the desires of
the wife who may look at her husband's conviction as the "for better
or for worse" aspect of the marriage relationship and may not want it
terminated. If one of the supposed purposes of a civil death statute is to
protect the feelings of the innocent spouse and children, such protection
is not provided for if the marriage relation is terminated without con-
sidering whether or not the innocent spouse desires to maintain the
marriage relationship.
A better view is expressed by a Rhode Island statute which provides:
.... that the bond of matrimony shall not thereby be dissolved,
nor shall the rights to property or other rights of the husband or
wife of the person so imprisoned be thereby terminated or im-
paired except on the entry of a decree for divorce lawfully ob-
tained.59
Under such a statute a spouse has grounds for divorce if it is desired,
and if not, the marriage can be maintained. Further, there is no ques-
tion, under this method, as to when the marriage relationship is termi-
nated.60
In addition to the basic rights already discussed, other rights have been
affected by civil death. Early American decisions construing civil death
as it had been in English common law held that a convicted felon was
57. 287 N.Y. 347, 39 N.E.2d 907 (1942).
58. In re Lindewall's Will, 287 N.Y. 347, 39 NE.2d 907, 912 (1942); see Annot., 139
A.L.R. 1308, 1323.
59. R.I. GEN. LAws. ANN. § 13-6-1 (1956).
60. A good discussion of domestic relations and civil death is found in Note, supra
note 1, at 974-77.
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incompetent to serve as a witness because of his total loss of both civil
rights and reputation and therefore, no credence could be given to his
testimony.61 Today, however, in New York, a statute allows a convict
to be a witness in any case,62 and his prior conviction will only affect his
credibility and not his capacity. Other rights of which the life convict
is more commonly deprived are the right to vote and to hold office.63
CIVIL DEATH IN MODERN SOCIETY
Statutes which treat a convict as if he were naturally dead in some
instances and alive in others have often led courts to inconsistent and
curious results. The practice of maintaining such an outdated legal
doctrine in a modern society is both confusing and conflicting. The
entire doctrine must be analyzed in light of contemporaneous thought
regarding rehabilitation to determine if it is a benefit to society and to
the individual sentenced to life imprisonment. Such an analysis reveals
that the doctrine's shortcomings have been recognized for some time.
The continued existence of civil death, outworn as a mode of
punishment and ineffective as a deterrent to crime, leads to in-
creasing confusion and uncertainty in its effects on the personal
and property relationships of life convicts. 6'
A civil death statute which removes some or all of a life convict's civil
rights nevertheless leaves him, unlike one actually deceased, with the
burden of certain liabilities such as the claims of his creditors (who may
reach his unprotected property),65 criminal prosecutions,6 6 and even
involuntary bankruptcy. 67
Another problem arises in Hawaii and Rhode Island which provide
61. "The stain of his iniquity ... is still left upon him.... The judgment of the
law upon that fact is that the credit of his oath is so absolutely and effectively
destroyed that it is not to be hoped that he will speak the truth, but must be con-
clusively assumed that he will not." People v. Bowen, 43 Cal. 439, 443, 13 Am. Rep. 148,
151 (1872).
62. N.Y. CPLR S 4513 (McKinney 1963).
63. The mere fact of incarceration makes the convict unable to perform these acts
though this is generally established by statute or judicial decision; see Comment, The
Rights of Prisoners While Incarcerated, 15 BuFFALO L. REv. 397, 409 (right to vote),
407 (right to hold office) (1965).
64. Note, supra note 1, at 977.
65. Coffee v. Haynes, 124 Cal. 561, 57 P. 482 (1899).
66. People v. Majors, 65 Cal. 138, 3 P. 597 (1884); People v. Hong Ah Duck, 61 Cal.
387 (1882); see People v. Hayes, 9 Cal. App. 2d 157, 49 P.2d 288 (1935).
67. In re Gainfort, 14 F. Supp. 788 (ND. Cal. 1936).
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for the estate of the life convict to pass to his heirs upon sentencing.
Without an estate the convict has nothing with which to retain counsel
for seeking parole nor any means of support in the case of a pardon. He
is left helpless; neither he nor society benefits in such an instance. Even
if the life convict retains full property rights, in some states he is still
unable to protect his estate since he is unable to sue in ejectment, waste,
or trespass and cannot enforce his contracts because access to the courts
is unavailable. 6 Such conflicting results are a clear indication that no
matter what logic is applied to civil death its inconsistencies prevail. It
is apparent that the legislatures of some states realize the harsh conse-
quences resulting from civil death and have attempted to avoid the
problem by providing for an administrator to exercise civil rights on
behalf of the convicted felon.6 9 If this is the practice, why have civil
death at all? This adherence by the legislature to an outdated fiction
while at the same time being aware of the doctrine's harshness is difficult
to rationalize.
In keeping with a rehabilitative theory of criminal administration,
several practices have evolved in modem penology which seem to be at
least a de facto repudiation of the old retributive theory upon which
civil death is based. One modern practice followed in many states is to
permit convicts to write and publish manuscripts. Considered from a re-
habilitation standpoint, this right of expression provides an oudet for
inner frustrations and keeps inmates occupied and mentally alert in the
routine of prison life. After considering the works of incarcerated
authors, few would doubt that such a practice is worthwhile. It seems
incongruous that a society allows life convicts expanded freedoms to
write and publish their manuscripts and yet still abides by civil death
with its consequent loss of civil rights.70
CIVIL DEATH-PARDON AND PAROLE
The most serious inconsistencies resulting from civil death appear
when considering pardon and parole of the life convict. Since pardons
and paroles are continually shortening the prison terms of the life con-
68. Avery v. Everett, 110 N.Y. 317, 334-35, 18 N.E. 148, 155-56 (1888) (Earl, J.,
dissenting).
69. Such is provided for in HAwAII REv. LAws § 353-35 (1968); see Application of
Fein, 51 Misc. 2d 1012, 274 N.Y.S.2d 547 (1966).
70. Note, The Right of Expression in Prison, 40 S. CAL. L. REv. 407, 420 (1967);
see Davis v. Superior Court, 175 Cal. App. 2d 8, 345 P.2d 513 (1959).
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vict,7 1 he is much more likely to find himself placed back into society
and it is in this situation that the inequities of civil death become most
apparent. Therefore, a new and more cautious look must be taken at
civil death.
Considering pardon first, it has generally been held by judicial de-
cision or by statutory mandate that a pardon restores the civil rights to
the convict. 2 Problems arise when, although some rights are restored
by the pardon, restoration to the convict of interests already vested in
others as a consequence of the sentence is impossible. For example,
when pardoned, the convict, whose estate was divested when he was
sentenced, finds himself thrust into society with no means of support.
Similarly, although he is pardoned there is no way to restore him to his
former marriage relationship which was ipso facto terminated, perhaps
years earlier and possibly against the will of both parties.
Similar inequities result in regard to paroles. A life prisoner who is
released on parole, unlike in the case of a pardon, is not restored to his
civil rights since they are regarded as subsisting for the maximum term.73
Yet he, like the pardoned convict, is cast back into society with civil
death working the same inequities. To hold a man in the confines of
prison without civil rights is questionable, but to place this man into
society divested of those rights, by the action of civil death, is indeed
unconscionable. No man should be placed in society with his person
and property unprotected, without the right to sue and contract. Even
with a pardon restoring his civil rights, his estate and marriage rights
have long since vested in others and for that reason could not now be
restored to him. This harsh and extreme result is another example of
71. T. SELLIN, THE DEATH PENALTY, 72-79 (1959) (also in MODEL PENAL CODE (Tent.
Draft No. 9)) shows some interesting statistics on the actual average time a life con-
vict spends in prison. Likewise, figures show that only about 25 per cent of life
convicts actually serve a life term. Seventy-five per cent are released by various means
such as parole and pardon. The median actual sentence served by life convicts was
11 years and 10 months in 1939, but dropped to 10 years 7 months in 1946. ROYAL
COMMISSION ON CAPITAL PUNISHMENT 1949-1953, REPORT App. 16 at 495 (1953); see
Note, supra note 1, at 970.
72. Mo. STAT. AN,. § 222.030 (1959). Some rights are restored by pardon. White v.
State, 260 App. Div. 412, 23 N.Y.S.2d 526 (1940); State v. Election Board, 169 Okla.
363, 36 P.2d 20 (1934) (right to hold office); N.Y. EXEC. LAW § 242 (McKinney 1951)
(right to vote); MONT. REv. CODE ANN. § 94-9817 (1947). Iowa is peculiar in that
pardoned convicts are not restored to their citizenship until a Certificate of Restora-
tion of the Rights of Citizenship is issued by the governor. Note, Civil Consequences
of Conviction for a Felony, 12 DRAXE L. RFv. 141, 143 (1963).
73. Vedin v. McConnell, 22 F.2d 753 (9th Cir. 1927); Gargan v. Sculley, 82 Misc.
667, 670, 144 N.Y.S. 205, 207 (1913).
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unnecessary and unproductive adherance to an outmoded legal fiction.
Modern conditions concerning parole and pardon have brought the life
convict back into society within a relatively short period of time thereby
creating a drastic need to have his basic rights clearly defined and his
status unquestionably specified. Functioning under an archaic theory
like civil death, this is impossible to achieve.
To further emphasize, there has been a gradually occurring phe-
nomenon in the law of penology and criminal justice which will have
a tremendous impact on society as well as create a critical need for
untangling the maze of inconsistencies and confusions resulting from
the application of civil death. This phenomenon is the de facto abolition
of the death penalty in all states. Statistics analyzing the number of
prisoners executed for crime on a state-by-state basis reveals the numbers
have been decreasing annually.74 This trend took an even sharper drop
in the 1960's and in 1967 only three state prisoners were executed. Since
74. The following table from the Statistical Abstract of the Un7ited States at 158
(1968) shows the decreasing trend in the number of executions in the United States
since 1940:
No. 240. PRIsoNERs EXECUTED UNDER CIVIL AUTHORITY-STATES: 1940 To 1968
Ibeath penalty illegal in States not listed (Alaska, Hawai, Maine, Michigan, Minnesota, North Dakota, Rhode Island and
Wisconsin) and as noted, with certain exceptions in New Hampshire, New York, North Dakota, Rhode Island, and Vermont
under the provisions of which no executions have taken place. Method of execution: E-electrocution, G-lethal gas.
H-hanging, and S-shooting or hanging.]
STATEAN MTHOD 1940- 1910- 1060- 1967 1968 STATE AND METoOD 1940- 1950- 1960- 1967 1963
oF ExEcUrTxoe 1949 1959 1966 oF Ex UTI No 1949 1959 1966
Tota[l(X) ....... 1,284 717 189 2 - Mont. (H) ........... I - - - -
Nebr. (E) ............ 2 2 - - -
Ala. (E) .............. 50 20 5 - - Nev. (G) ............ 10 9 2 - -Aris. (G)............. 9 8 4 - -
Ark. (E) ............. 36 18 9 - N.J. (E) ............ 14 17 3 - -
Calif. (G)........... 80 74 29 1 - N. Mex. (G) ......... .2 3 1 - -
Colo. (G) ............. 13 3 5 1 - N.Y. (E) ............ 114 52 10 (2) (3)
Conn. (E)............ 10 5 1 - - N.C. (G) ............ 112 19 1 -
Del (H) .............. 4 (1) (2) - - Ohio (E) ............ 51 32 7 - -
D. C. (E) ............. 16 4 - - - Okla. (E) ............ 13 7 6 - -
Fla. () ............. 65 49 12 - - Oreg. (G)............12 4 1 1 (1) (4)
Ga. (E) .............. 130 85 14 - - Pa.(E)............ 36 31 3 - -
Idaho(11)............ - 3 - - - S.0.(E)............61 26 8 -
Il. (E) ............... 18 9 2 S.Dak.(E).......... I - - -
Ind. (E) .............. 7 2 1 - - Tenn. (E) ........... 37 8 1 - -
Iowa (H) ..... .... 7 1 2 (3) (3) Tex. (E) *............ 74 74 29 - -
Hans. (H) ............ 5 5 5 - - Utah (S) ............ 4 6 1 - -
.Ky. (E) .............. 34 16 1 - - Vt. (E) .............. 1 2 - () (2)
La. (E) .............. 47 27 1 - - Va. (E) ............ 35 23 6
Md. (G) ......... ... 45 6 1 - - Wash. (H)...........16 6 2
Mass. (E) ............. 9 - - - - W. Va. (E) .......... 11 9 - () (')
Mis.(G) ............. 60 36 10 - - Wyo. G) ............ 2 - -
Mo. (G) .............. 15 7 4 - -
- Represents zero. X Not applicable.
I Includes 23 Federal executions not shown by State (1940-1949, 13; 1950-1959, 9; and 1960-1966, 1).
2 Death penalty illegal from Apr. 2, 1958, to Dec. 18, 1961. 3 Death penalty abolished.
4 Capital punishment abolished after a referendum in November 1964.
Source of tables 239 and 240: Dept. of Justice, Bureau of PriLsons; National Prisonrw Statistics, bulletin No. 45.
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that time there have been none. The reasons for this drop are specula-
tive and an entire topic in itself, but the result has not been because the
death penalty has been repealed as a means of punishment.7 5 Perhaps
since the legislatures have not acted to repeal the death penalty, the
executives have taken the initiative and have refused to impose it. Never-
theless, the longer this trend of "no executions" lasts, the more certain
will become this de facto abolition. Certainly no state wants to push
forward during such a lull and be the first to renew enforcement of the
unpopular death penalty. State legislatures will not only have to repeal
the death sentence but they will also have to review the life sentence
with all its various failures including civil death, since it will very likely
be more frequently imposed, becoming the most severe means of punish-
ment. All jurisdictions especially those with civil death statutes will
need to re-evaluate the life sentence not only in its practical application
but also from a constitutional standpoint." For a doctrine with so many
inconsistencies to treat a particular class of persons with such inequality
would certainly lend itself to criticism for lack of equal protection under
the law.
CONCLUSION
To keep a convicted criminal away from the polls and out of public
office serves the public; to keep him from asserting frivolous court suits
maintains prison discipline; but, to keep him from suing on his contracts
and to dissolve his marriage serves the interests of no one. Because it no
longer serves any real purpose and likewise lacks legislative direction
as to how it is to be administered, a lack of uniformity has resulted in
applying the fiction of civil death. Being aware of this, plus an increase
in the number of paroles and with the life sentence taking on a more
important role as the maximum sentence, the legislatures of the various
states should finally meet the problem directly and repeal their civil
death statutes. Whether or not these statutes are currently enforced,
they present serious inequities which can only be eliminated by their
repeal.
A much better plan for administering the civil rights of the life con-
vict would be to abolish civil death and follow the California statutory
scheme of allowing the life convict to retain his rights with direction
75. Alaska, Hawaii, Maine, Minnesota, North Dakota, Rhode Island and Wisconsin
are states which have repealed the death penalty. Id.
76. Note, Prison Life and Prisoner's Rights, 53 IowA L. REv., 671, 672-73 (1967).
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over their use by an Adult Authority. This plan would enable the con-
vict to assert his rights when needed, but would prevent him from abus-
ing those rights, thereby maintaining prison discipline. This type of plan
is flexible, just, and effective. Such a repeal would eliminate the com-
mon law effects of civil death and put an end to its resulting inconsisten-
cies, thereby allowing the civil rights of convicts to be administered in
a manner more equitable to them and more productive to society. Fi-
nally, then, civil death would be put to rest-a status it so justly deserves.
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